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THE FIRE THIS TIME: THE GENESIS OF THE
LOS ANGELES REBELLION OF 1992
JAMES H. JOHNSON, JR.* & WALTER C. FARRELL, JR.**
Almost twenty-five years after the release of the Kerner Commission
Report,' which assessed the conditions that sparked the civil disorders of
the 1960s, the worst civil unrest of this century occurred in Los Angeles
in the spring of 1992. Following the acquittal of four white police officers
accused of the videotaped beating of black2 motorist Rodney King, three
days of burning, looting, and violence erupted that resulted in fifty-eight
deaths, 2500 injuries, 16,000 arrests, and nearly one billion dollars of
property damage and loss. Quelling the civil unrest and re-establishing a
sense of calm in the city required the deployment of the full forces of the
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, as well as significant numbers of California High-
way Patrol officers and military troops.3
This Essay addresses the underlying causes of this civil disturbance.
It begins with a critical evaluation of the Bush Administration's account
of the seeds of the uprising and then offers an alternative, more realistic,
explanation anchored in the realities of life in the Los Angeles communi-
ties where the burning, looting, and violence were disproportionately
concentrated.
The Essay contends that the touchstones of the Los Angeles vio-
lence mirrored those that the 1968 Kerner Commission concluded had
sparked the violent civil disorders of the 1960s,4 and that the 1988 Corn-
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1. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DIsORDERS (Bantam Books
1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMM'N REPORT].
2. Editor's Note: The contributors to this symposium have used the terms "African
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North Carolina Law Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
3. See Toll from the Riots, USA TODAY, May 5, 1992, at 4A; LA Aftermath at a Glance,
USA TODAY, May 6, 1992, at 3A.
4. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 236.
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mission on the Cities found still existed as "quiet riots" in central-city
ghetto communities twenty years later.' These factors included hopeless-
ness and despair as a consequence of worsening economic deprivation,
accelerating neighborhood decline and deterioration, and increasing spa-
tial and social isolation from mainstream economic and educational op-
portunities-conditions aggravated by persistent incidences of police
brutality and discriminatory treatment by the criminal justice system in
general.
In addition to these "traditional" sparks, this Essay notes further
that there was a unique trigger in this civil disturbance that was not a
factor inspiring the civil disorders of the 1960s: the presence of other
nonwhite ethnic minority groups (i.e., Asians and Hispanics) with whom
blacks have found themselves in direct competition and conflict for jobs,
housing, and other scarce resources.6 Ethnic antagonisms among these
minority groups figured heavily in the pattern of burning, looting, and
violence.
Finally, the Essay concludes with an assessment of selected strate-
gies that have been proposed or implemented to revitalize south central
Los Angeles and other poor urban communities and to improve the life
chances of their residents, and thereby to prevent recurrences of similar
civil disturbances.
I. THE CONSERVATIVE EXPLANATION
In the immediate aftermath of the recent Los Angeles civil unrest,
the Bush Administration accused south central Los Angeles gangs of in-
citing and orchestrating the uprising.7 The gangs were characterized as
"opportunistic thugs" who used the verdict in the police brutality trial as
an excuse to wreak havoc in the city.8 The Bush Administration also
blamed the civil unrest on Democratic President Lyndon Johnson's War
on Poverty programs of the 1960s.9
5. QUIET RIOTS: RACE AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES xiii (Fred R. Harris &
Roger W. Wilkins eds., 1988).
6. James H. Johnson, Jr. & Melvin L. Oliver, Interethnic Minority Conflict in Urban
America: The Effects of Economic and Social Dislocations, 10 URB. GEOGRAPHY 449, 449-63
(1989); Melvin L. Oliver & James H. Johnson, Jr., Interethnic Conflict in an Urban Ghetto:
The Case of Blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles, 6 RES. Soc. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS &
CHANGE 57, 84-88 (1984).
7. Jack Nelson, Bush Reaction to Riots Splits Republicans, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1992, at
A4.
8. Id.
9. R.W. Apple, Jr., Bush Says Largess Won't Help Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at
A22; John Harwood, Bush Reaffirms View that Federal Aid Isn't Solution to Cities' Problems,
WALL ST. I., May 7, 1992, at A16; Robert Pear, Clinton Tours City's Damaged Areas and
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A careful analysis of the situation, however, reveals that neither of
these contentions was true. South central Los Angeles gang members
constituted a slim minority of the participants, and there is no evidence
to suggest that they were the leaders of the uprising, despite the arrest
records of the involved gang members."° Moreover, the area affected by
the civil unrest was far too extensive geographically for south-central Los
Angeles area gangs to have orchestrated the violence. There were hot
spots of rebellious activity throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan
area. The civil unrest extended well beyond the boundaries of the Watts
rebellion of 1965.11
Nor was the civil unrest related, in any significant way, to the War
on Poverty programs of the 1960s. The Republicans were in control of
the White House for all but four of the past twenty-five years. During
this period, and especially during the Reagan Administration, the
Republicans waged a massive assault on War on Poverty programs, dis-
mantling some and substantially reducing support for others.12 As data
from a recently released census report reveals, the national poverty rate
is higher today than it was twenty-five years ago, not because of the War
on Poverty programs, but rather as a consequence of Republican cuts in
the social welfare arena.13 The recent civil unrest never would have oc-
curred, in all probability, if President Johnson's War on Poverty had
been allowed to run its course as initially envisioned. 14
II. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
In response to the Bush Administration's erroneous assertions, we
argued in a recent paper that "the civil unrest was rooted in the high
degree of frustration and alienation that had built up among the citizens
of south central Los Angeles over the past quarter century as a conse-
Chides Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1992, at A26; David E. Rosenbaum, Decoding the Remarks
by Fitzwater on Riots, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A24; Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots
Sprang from Lack of Family Values, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at Al, AI2; Michael Wines,
White House Links Riots to Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1992, at Al.
10. Paul Lieberman, 40% of Riot Suspects Have Criminal Records, L.A. TIMES, May 19,
1992, at B1.
11. James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., Seeds of the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992, 17 INT'L J.
URB. & REGIONAL RES. 116 fig. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Seeds of Rebellion].
12. GARY ORFIELD & CAROL ASHKANIZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POL-
ICY AND BLACK ATLANTA (1991); THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REVISITED: AIMS AND OUT-
COMES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 224-28 (D. Lee Bawden ed.,
1984); Ronald Walters, The Reagan Revolution Sparked LA's Rebellion, WALL ST. J., May 7,
1992, at A15.
13. The War Against the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A28.
14. Bill Hendrick, LBJ's War on Poverty Still Makes Sense Now, GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD, May 17, 1992, at A4.
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quence of poor relations between the LAPD and the minority commu-
nity."15 We argued further in another article that the unrest also
reflected "a number of broader external forces that have increasingly iso-
lated the south central Los Angeles community, geographically and eco-
nomically, from the mainstream of Los Angeles society."' 16 The real
touchstones of the civil unrest, in our view, included a number of quite
different triggers, including those discussed in the following pages.1 7
A. Repeated acts of what is widely perceived in the minority
community to be a blatant abuse of power by the police and the
criminal justice system in general
As we have argued elsewhere, "the verdict in the police brutality
trial was merely the straw that 'broke the proverbial camel's back.' "I'
The videotaped beating of Rodney King was, in fact, only the most re-
cent case in which serious concerns were raised about the possible use of
excessive force by the LAPD to subdue or arrest a black citizen.19 For
several years, the LAPD has paid out millions of taxpayers' dollars in
compensation to local citizens who were victims of abuse, illegal searches
and seizures, and property damage.20
Moreover, the black citizens of the city of Los Angeles have been
victimized disproportionately by the LAPD's use of the bar arm control
and choke holds, outlawed tactics that formerly were employed to sub-
due suspects perceived to be uncooperative. Between 1975 and 1982, six-
teen Los Angeles citizens died as a result of LAPD officers' use of these
restraint tactics: twelve of them were black.2
In a similar vein, the "not guilty" verdict rendered in the Rodney
King police brutality trial was only the most recent in a series of deci-
sions widely perceived in the black community to be grossly unjust. This
decision followed closely on the heels of a controversial verdict in the
Latasha Harlins case.22 A videotape revealed that Ms. Harlins-an
honor student at a local high school-was fatally shot in the back of the
15. Seeds of Rebellion, supra note 11, at 116.
16. James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., The Los Angeles Rebellion: A Retrospective View, 6
ECON. DEv. Q. 356, 359 (1992) [hereinafter Retrospective View].
17. See infra notes 18-88 and accompanying text.
18. Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 359.
19. MIKE DAviS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN Los ANGELES 267-
322 (1990).
20. Id
21. Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 359.
22. Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1992, at Al, AS.
1406 [Vol. 71
THE URBAN CRISIS
head by a Korean shopkeeper following an altercation over a bottle of
orange juice. Although the jury found the shopkeeper guilty of felony
manslaughter, the judge decided to place her on five years probation and
required her to perform only six months of community service.2 3
B. Recent changes in the composition of the Los Angeles population,
and the failure of state and local elected officials to implement
human relations policies to mitigate the ethnic antagonisms that
have accompanied this population change
Over the last thirty years, the Los Angeles population has become
more ethnically diverse.24 In 1960, nearly two-thirds of the metropolitan
Los Angeles population were non-Hispanic whites. By 1990, largely as a
consequence of heightened immigration (both legal and illegal) and the
substantial exodus of non-Hispanic whites, nonwhite ethnic minority
groups (i.e., Asians, blacks, and Hispanics) numerically had become the
majority population of Los Angeles County, accounting for 58% of the
total. Approximately one-third of the metropolitan population was His-
panic. Blacks and Asians each accounted for about 12%.25
Nowhere was this ethnic change more apparent than in south cen-
tral Los Angeles, where the civil unrest erupted and the burning, looting,
and violence were most intensely concentrated.26 Two types of ethnic
transition have occurred in the formerly all black south central Los An-
geles communities.27
The first ethnic transition was a black-to-brown population succes-
sion in the residential neighborhoods, which began in the 1960s and ac-
celerated in the 1970s and the 1980s. 28 In 1970, an estimated 50,000
Hispanics were residing in south central Los Angeles neighborhoods,
representing 10% of the area's total population. That number had
doubled to 100,000, or 21% of the total population, by 1980. Today
roughly half of the population of south central Los Angeles is Hispanic.29
Concomitant to this black-to-brown residential transition, an ethnic
succession also was taking place in the south central Los Angeles busi-
ness community.3" Prior to the Watts rebellion of 1965, most of the busi-
23. Id at A8.
24. James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., Ethnic Dilemmas in Comparative Perspective, 10 URB.
GEOGRAPHY 425, 425-33 (1989).
25. Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 359.
26. Id.
27. Johnson & Oliver, supra note 6, at 84-88.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 456-57.
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nesses in the area were owned and operated by Jewish shopkeepers. In
the aftermath of those disturbances, the Jewish business owners fled the
area and were replaced not by black entrepreneurs, but, rather, by newly
arriving Korean immigrants who opened small retail and service estab-
lishments in the area."1
These transitions in the residential and business communities of
south central Los Angeles have not been particularly smooth. The three
ethnic minority groups-Asians, blacks, and Hispanics-have found
themselves in fierce competition and conflict over access to jobs, housing,
and other resources, including the political levers of power in the city.32
The conflict has been most intense between blacks and Korean entrepre-
neurs.33 Disadvantaged blacks in south central Los Angeles view Ko-
rean merchants as "foreigners" who take advantage of them by charging
high prices, refusing to hire local blacks, failing to reinvest any of their
profits to otherwise aid the community, and being rude and discourteous
in their treatment of black customers.34 According to Edward Chang, an
expert on black-Korean relations in Los Angeles, the disrespect that Ko-
rean merchants accord black customers is rooted in Korean stereotypes
of blacks "as criminals, welfare recipients, drug addicts, and/or lazy."3
Koreans acquire these stereotypes before they arrive in the United States,
Chang contends, through American movies, television shows, and
Armed Forces Korean Network Programs. 6
Prior to the jury's verdict in the Rodney King police brutality trial,
Korean-black relations in Los Angeles had reached a state of near crisis.
Blacks openly questioned how Koreans are able to generate the capital to
start or take over businesses in their community when willing black en-
trepreneurs are unable to raise such funds. The Los Angeles Sentinel, the
city's major black weekly newspaper, consistently derided Asian shop-
keepers for their lack of courteousness to black customers, reporting both
the important and the trivial instances of conflict.3 7 It was the previously
described decision in the Latasha Harlins case, however, which preceded
31. Id. at 454-55.
32. Id. at 455-58.
33. Id. at 457-58.
34. Edward Chang, Korean-black Conflict in Los Angeles: Perceptions and Realities 20
(1988) (unpublished paper on file with author).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. James H. Cleaver, Asian Attitudes Toward Blacks Cause Raised Eyebrows, L.A. SEN-
TINEL, Aug. 18, 1983, at 1; James H. Cleaver, Citizens Air Gripes About Asians, L.A. SENTI-
NEL, Sept. 1, 1983, at 1; James H. Cleaver, One Answer to an Outcry, L.A. SENTINEL, Mar. 19,
1987, at 1; James H. Cleaver, Residents Complain About Alleged Asian 'Problem', L.A. SENTI-
NEL, Aug. 25, 1983, at 1.
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the verdict in the Rodney King case by only a few months, that escalated
the conflict between black residents and Korean merchants in south cen-
tral Los Angeles to crisis proportions.33
Assessments of the 1992 civil unrest strongly support the contention
that rapidly deteriorating relations between black residents and Korean
merchants of south central Los Angeles were also touchstones of the up-
rising. Korean businesses were strategically targeted in the burning and
the looting. Roughly half of the buildings either severely damaged or
destroyed during the civil unrest were either Korean owned or
operated.39
The King verdict also brought to the fore what apparently was a
brewing but previously hidden element of interethnic minority conflict in
Los Angeles: antagonisms between Hispanics and Koreans in Korea-
town." While often viewed as an ethnic enclave demarcated by Korean
control of businesses, Koreatown is actually a residentially mixed com-
munity with a large proportion of Hispanic residents (principally Central
American immigrants) and Koreans. It was in this area that Hispanic
involvement in the civil unrest was most intense. Post-disturbance
surveys and focus group research indicate that Hispanics in this commu-
nity come in contact with Koreans on multiple levels and apparently ex-
perience hostility at each level. First, on a residential level, Hispanics
complain of discrimination by Korean landlords who rent houses and
apartments according to racial background.4 ' Second, Hispanic custom-
ers in Korean establishments complain of disrespectful treatment, similar
to black customers.42 Third, as employees in Korean business establish-
ments, Hispanics express concern about exploitation by their Korean em-
ployers.43 Apparently, Hispanics vented their anger and frustration over
such discriminatory treatment by looting and destroying a significant
number of the Korean-owned businesses in Koreatown."
Prior to the uprising, local elected officials were well aware that eth-
nic tensions were potentially explosive among nonwhite ethnic minority
groups in Los Angeles. At both the city and the county levels of govern-
ment, human relations commissions long have existed to deal with such
38. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
39. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMIrEE ON RECOVERY AND REVITALIZATION TO
THE Los ANGELES CITY COUNCIL (October 29, 1992).
40. LAWRENCE BOBO ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE AND AFTER A SPRING OF DIs-
CONTENT (3 CSUP Occasional Working Paper Series 1992).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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problems. These agencies traditionally have been poorly funded, how-
ever, and they have been delegated little or no decision-making power or
authority to develop policies to resolve the array of intergroup conflicts
that are a part of life in the diverse communities of Los Angeles.
As a consequence, both the city and the county human relations
commissions have limited their actions to convening hearings on racially,
ethnically, and religiously motivated violence and to implementing edu-
cational programs that seek to change the stereotypical ways in which
the diverse ethnic groups of Los Angeles view one another. For example,
prior to the civil unrest, the City of Los Angeles Human Relations Com-
mission was instrumental in bringing black leaders and Korean entrepre-
neurs in south central Los Angeles together for "prayer breakfasts."45
These sessions were supposed to offer an opportunity for the two groups
to iron out their differences and promote mutual understanding. Unfor-
tunately, neither this nor any of the other efforts sponsored by the human
relations commissions have been very successful. In fact, realizing that
little progress had been made in reducing the tensions between the two
groups, black and Korean leaders recently agreed to stop holding such
meetings.46
C. The creation of a laissez-faire business climate that has drastically
altered the structure of economic opportunity in south central Los
Angeles and other inner-city communities
Over the past two decades, the federal government has attempted to
create a deregulated business environment to increase the competitive-
ness of U.S. firms in the global marketplace. Changes in antitrust laws
and their enforcement have resulted in a growing concentration of large,
vertically and horizontally integrated firms in key sectors of the econ-
omy. Due to their economic power and control of markets, these large
conglomerates have been able to move capital quickly and efficiently to
select national and international locations to take advantage of cheap la-
bor. 7 There is growing evidence that the federal government, especially
during the Bush Administration, may in fact have used taxpayers' dollars
to provide incentives for United States firms to relocate abroad, espe-
45. Sophia Kim, Seeking a Dialogue by Koreans, Blacks, L.A. TIMES, June 8,1984, § 5, at
8.
46. A Lament for the Loss of Some Dialogue, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at B6.
47. James H. Johnson, Jr. & Melvin L. Oliver, Structural Changes in the U.S. Economy
and Black Male Joblessness: A Reassessment, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPOR-
TUNITY 115-19 (George E. Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992) [hereinafter Reassessment].
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cially to Central American countries.4 8
Furthermore, to facilitate the competitiveness of firms remaining in
the United States, the federal government, especially during the Reagan
Administration, relaxed environmental regulations and substantially cut
both the budgets and the staffs of governmental agencies charged with
the enforcement of laws governing workplace health, safety, and com-
pensation, as well as hiring, retention, and promotion practices.49
This shift toward a laissez-faire business climate is partially respon-
sible for the wholesale exodus of manufacturing employment from urban
communities. It also precipitated the emergence of new industrial spaces
in the suburbs, exurbs, and nonmetropolitan areas in this country, as well
as the movement of manufacturing activities to Third World countries.5
The new industrial spaces emerging on the U.S. landscape are, in fact,
usually situated in places where there are few blacks in the local labor
market and few blacks within reasonable commuting distance. 1
Nowhere have the effects of these policies been more apparent than
in south central Los Angeles. Between 1978 and 1989, approximately
200,000 "good paying" manufacturing jobs disappeared from the Los
Angeles economy. 52 South central Los Angeles-the traditional indus-
trial core of the city-bore the brunt of this deindustrialization.53 For
example, while well-paying and stable jobs were disappearing from south
central Los Angeles, local employers were seeking alternative sites for
their manufacturing activities. These seemingly routine decisions stimu-
lated the emergence of new employment growth nodes or "technopoles"
in the San Fernando Valley, in the San Gabriel Valley, in El Segundo
near the airport in Los Angeles County, and in nearby Orange County.54
These communities have very small or nonexistent black populations and
are geographically inaccessible to a majority of the residents of south
central Los Angeles.
48. Michael de Courcy Hinds, Survey Cited to Assail Bush on Overseas Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1992, at A35.
49. See THE REAGAN RECORD: AN ASSESSMENT OF AMERICA'S CHANGING PRIORITIES
303-12 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1984).
50. Reassessment, supra note 47, at 117-18, 142-43.
51. Robert E. Cole & Donald R. Deskins, Jr., Racial Factors in Site Location and Employ-
ment Patterns of Japanese Auto Firms in America, 31 CAL. MGMT. REv. 9, 13 (1988).
52. See generally Ed Soja et al., Urban Restructuring: An Analysis of Social and Spatial
Change in Los Angeles, 59 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 195, 221-25 (1983) (discussing industry em-
ployment statistics from 1978-82). For data covering the years 1982-1989, see THE DATA
CENTER, PLANT SHUTDOWNS MONITOR DIRECTORY, 1982-1989.
53. Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 359-61.
54. Allen J. Scott, Flexible Production Systems and Regional Development: The Rise of
New Industrial Spaces in North America and Western Europe, 12 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL
RES. 171, 178-82 (1988).
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At the same time, a number of Los Angeles-based employers also
established production facilities in the Mexican border towns of Tijuana,
Ensenada, and Tecate. Between 1978 and 1989, at least 215 Los Ange-
les-based firms participated in this deconcentration process, including
Hughes Aircraft, Northrop, Rockwell, and many smaller firms. 5 Such
capital flight, in conjunction with Los Angeles plant closings, essentially
has denied the residents of south central Los Angeles access to formerly
well-paying, unionized jobs. 6
New employment opportunities have emerged within or near the
traditional industrial core in south central Los Angeles." Unlike the
manufacturing jobs that disappeared from this area, however, the new
jobs are in the competitive sector of the economy, including the hospital-
ity services industry (i.e., hotels, motels, restaurants, and entertainment)
and such craft specialty industries as clothing, jewelry, and furniture
manufacturing.58
Competitive sector employers survive only to the extent that their
prices remain nationally and internationally competitive. To remain
competitive, they often hire undocumented workers, offer unattractive
working conditions, and pay, at best, the minimum wage. 9 Research
indicates that newly arriving illegal Hispanic immigrants who have set-
tled in south central Los Angeles often are preferred over blacks in the
competitive sector employment market because of their undocumented
status.60
In part as a consequence of these developments, and partly because
of employers' openly negative attitudes toward black workers,61 when the
Rodney King police brutality verdict was handed down on April 29,
1992, south central Los Angeles communities were characterized by high
concentrations of two disadvantaged populations: the working poor,
who are predominantly Hispanic, and the jobless poor, who are predomi-
55. Soja et al., supra note 52, at 200-02.
56. BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF
BASIC INDUSTRY 51-61 (1982); Gregory D. Squires, "Run Away Plants," Capital Mobility, and
Black Economic Rights, in COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN CONFLICT: PLANT CLOSINGS AND
JOB Loss 64-66 (John C. Raines et al. eds., 1982).
57. See Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 362 fig. 3.
58. Id.
59. FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS: THE CHANGING AMERICAN INCOME DIS-
TRIBUTION 209-12 (1987).
60. THOMAS MUELLER & THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, THE FOURTH WAVE: CALIFOR-
NIA'S NEWEST IMMIGRANTS 95-102 (1984).
61. Joleen Kirschenman & Katherine M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But
... " The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 203-32 (Christo-
pher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
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nantly black.62
Most of the individuals inhabiting these communities thus had in-
sufficient incomes to maintain a decent standard of living. Both
groups-Hispanics and blacks-were isolated geographically from main-
stream employment opportunities that pay livable wages. Intergroup
tensions were high as poor blacks and Hispanics competed for competi-
tive sector jobs and other scarce resources.63
D. Wholesale disinvestment in south central Los Angeles by the city
government and other local institutions
In addition to the adverse impacts of a laissez-faire business policy
on the structure of employment opportunities in south central Los Ange-
les, the local government has failed to devise and implement a plan to
redevelop and revitalize the community. Instead, the city has pursued
avidly a policy of downtown and westside redevelopment in an effort to
lure international capital to Los Angeles.'
The "power of the pocketbook" appears to have driven this redevel-
opment strategy. Data compiled by Frank Clifford, Rich Connell, Ste-
phen Braun, and Andrea Ford indicate that "[s]ince 1983, Los Angeles
city officeholders and candidates have received $23 million in political
contributions, mostly from the Westside, the San Fernando Valley and
Downtown businesses."65 They note further that "[p]olitical experts and
City Hall critics say the contributions make elected officials more attuned
to corporate interests and the suburbs than to the city's poorer areas."66
The transformation of the skylines of downtown and the so-called
Wilshire corridor-the twenty mile stretch extending along Wilshire
Boulevard from downtown to the Pacific Ocean-is evidence of the suc-
cess of this redevelopment strategy. A symbol of Los Angeles's emerging
transactional economy, this area now houses the headquarters of a
number of multinational corporations and other advanced service sector
employers.67
This type of redevelopment, however, has done little to improve the
62. At that time, the black male jobless rate in some residential areas of south central Los
Angles hovered around 50%. Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 361.
63. Johnson & Oliver, supra note 6, at 79-80. See generally Ed Luttwak, The Riots: Un-
derclass v Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at A29 (describing the loss of traditional
underclass jobs to more educated workers and immigrants).
64. H. BRIAVEL HOLCOMB & ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD, REVITALIZING CITIES 25-26
(1981); Frank Clifford et al., Leaders Lose Feel for L.A., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, at Al.
65. Clifford et al., supra note 64, at Al.
66. Id.
67. HOLCOMB & BEAUREGARD, supra note 64, at 25-36.
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quality of life of the residents of south central Los Angeles. Jobs in the
revitalized downtown area and along the Wilshire corridor typically re-
quire high levels of education and technical training-the ability to do
"head" work as opposed to "hand" work-that most of the disadvan-
taged residents of south central Los Angeles do not possess. The only
low-skilled employment opportunities that exist in this area are low-level
service and custodial jobs, which typically are filled by newly arrived
immigrants.
E. More than two decades of conservative social policy-making, at both
the federal and state levels of government, which have adversely
affected the quality of life of the residents of south central Los
Angeles and have accelerated the decline and deterioration of their
neighborhoods
Three examples of conservative social policy-making are provided
here. The first involves the federal government's dismantling of the so-
cial safety net in poor communities like south central Los Angeles
through massive cuts in federal aid to cities.68 Preston Niblack and Peter
Stan noted the impact on the city of Los Angeles: "The decline in federal
aid is striking: in 1977 the city received federal aid worth $370 million;
by 1990 these grants had dropped to $60 million--or from almost 18
percent of the city's operating budget to less than 2 percent.1 69
Perhaps most devastating for south central Los Angeles has been
the defunding of community-based organizations (CBOs) due to this
massive loss of federal assistance. Historically, CBOs were part of the
collection of social resources in the urban environment that encouraged
the inner-city disadvantaged, especially disadvantaged youth, to pursue
mainstream avenues of social and economic mobility and to avoid dys-
functional or anti-social behavior. In academic lingo, CBOs were effec-
tive "mediating institutions" in the inner city.70
In 1981, when President Reagan took office, CBOs received an esti-
mated 41% of their funding from the federal government. 71 As a conse-
quence of the Reagan Administration's elimination of the revenue
68. George E. Peterson, Urban Policy and the Cyclical Behavior of Cities, in REAGAN AND
THE CITIES 30 (George E. Peterson & Carol W. Lewis eds., 1986).
69. Preston Niblack & Peter J.E. Stan, Financing Public Services in Los Angeles, in UR-
BAN AMERICA: POLICY CHOICES FOR Los ANGELES AND THE NATION 267 (James B. Stein-
berg et al. eds., 1992).
70. See Melvin L. Oliver, The Urban Black Community as Network- Towards a Social
Network Perspective, 29 Soc. Q. 623, 639-40 (1988).
71. Lester M. Salamon, Nonprofit Organizations: The Lost Opportunity, in THE REAGAN
RECORD 279 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1984).
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sharing program, Los Angeles and other cities have been forced to re-
duce substantially grant support for community-based programs that tra-
ditionally have benefitted the most disadvantaged in the community. In
south central Los Angeles and other inner-city communities, teenagers
have been hurt most by this defunding of CBO initiatives and other
safety net programs.
State governments' anti-crime policy is the second area in which
conservative policies have had a negative impact.72 Paralleling the dis-
mantling of social programs that discouraged disadvantaged youth from
engaging in dysfunctional behavior and that rehabilitated those who did,
states (with the encouragement and support of the federal government)
have pursued for nearly three decades a policy of resolving the problems
of the inner city through the criminal justice system.73
Once a leader in the rehabilitation of criminals, California epito-
mizes this shift in anti-crime policy. In 1977, the California Legislature
enacted the Determinant Sentence Law, "which, among other things,
embraced punishment (and, explicitly, not rehabilitation) as the purpose
of prison, required mandatory prison sentences for many offenses for-
merly eligible for probation, and dramatically increased the rate at which
probation and parole violators were returned to prison."'74 As a conse-
quence of the passage of this law, the California prison population
skyrocketed from 22,000 to 106,000 between 1980 and 1992, an increase
of 300%.75
To accommodate this increase, California expanded the capacity of
seven of its existing prisons and built thirteen new facilities to bring the
current total to twenty-five; six additional correctional facilities currently
are under construction or in the planning phase.7 6 Over the past five
years, spending on the criminal justice system increased by 70%, approx-
imately four times greater than total state spending. By comparison,
state spending on education increased by only 10% during this same five
year period.77
Minorities have been affected disproportionately by California's "get
tough on crime" policies. Two-thirds of the prison population is black or
72. See, eg., Joan Petersilia, Crime and Punishment in California: Full Cells, Empty
Pockets, and Questionable Benefits, in URBAN AMERICA: POLICY CHOICES FOR LOS ANGELES
AND THE NATION 175 (James B. Steinberg et al. eds., 1992).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Id. at 177-79.
76. Id. at 179.
77. Id. at 181.
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Hispanic, with blacks constituting 35% of the total.78 How have the mi-
nority residents of south central Los Angeles fared under the current
policy? Reliable statistics to answer this question are difficult to assem-
ble, but the number of people arrested during the recent civil unrest who
already had a criminal record is probably a fairly accurate barometer.
Approximately 40% of those arrested had a prior brush with the law.7 9
What are the prospects of landing a job if you have a criminal record?
"Incarceration breeds despair, and hopelessness, and in the employment
arena is the 'Scarlet Letter' of unemployability.
80
Educational initiatives enacted at the state level during the late
1970s and the early 1980s, which were designed to address the "crisis" in
American education, constitute the third affected policy domain." So-
cial science evidence indicates that policies such as tracking by ability
group, grade retention, and the increasing reliance on standardized tests
as the ultimate arbiter of educational success have, in fact, negatively
affected large numbers of black and brown youths.82 In urban school
systems, they are placed disproportionately in special education classes
and are more likely than their white counterparts to be subjected to ex-
treme disciplinary sanctions.83
The effects of these policies in the Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
trict (LAUSD) are evident in the data on school-leaving behavior.84 In
the LAUSD as a whole, 39.3% of all students in the class of 1988
dropped out at some point during their high school years. For high
schools in south central Los Angeles, however, the drop-out rates were
substantially higher, between 63% and 79%. It is important to note that
the drop-out problem is not limited to the high school population.
LAUSD data reveals that approximately 24% of the students in some
south central Los Angeles junior high schools also dropped out during
the 1987-88 academic year.85
Twenty years ago, it was possible to drop out of high school before
78. Id. at 178.
79. Lieberman, supra note 10, at B1.
80. Reassessment, supra note 47, at 144.
81. See generally Gary Orfield, Exclusion of the Majority: Shrinking College Access and
Public Policy in Metropolitan Los Angeles, 20 URB. REV. 147, 147 (1988) (examining "trends in
white and minority student experiences in the high schools, the community colleges, and the
universities of the greater Los Angeles area since the mid-1970s").
82. Id. at 160-61.
83. Reassessment, supra note 47, at 143-44.
84. See CALIFORNIA BASIC EDUCATIONAL DATA SYSTEM, THREE YEAR SUMMARY:
NUMBER OF DROPOUTS IN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL INSTRUCTION (1989).
85. Los ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, DROPOUT RATES IN LAUSD JUNIOR
HIGH SCHOOLS 1987-88 (1989).
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graduation and find a good-paying job in heavy manufacturing in south
central Los Angeles. Today, those types of jobs are no longer available.
The result of the adverse effects of deindustrialization and the discrimi-
natory aspects of educational reforms is a rather substantial pool of in-
ner-city males of color who are neither at work nor in school. These
individuals are, in effect, idle; previous research demonstrates that it is
this population which is most likely to be involved in gang activity, drug
trafficking, and a range of other criminal behaviors.8 6 Moreover, it is idle
minority males who experience the most difficulty maintaining stable
families.8 7 Together, these phenomena account, at least in part, for the
high percentage of female-headed families with incomes below the pov-
erty level in south central Los Angeles when the uprising began. 8
III. POSTSCRIPT
The Los Angeles civil unrest of 1992 differed, in several critical re-
spects, from the civil disorders of the 1960s.
First, it required the deployment of a significantly greater number of
emergency personnel, and it exacted a heavier toll on the local commu-
nity than did the civil disorders of the 1960s."9
Second, although blacks were the main participants in most of the
earlier civil disorders, a range of ethnic groups participated in the recent
conflagration in Los Angeles. Some of the incidents, for example, in-
cluded white as well as Hispanic participants.90
Third, whereas the geographical impact of the civil disorders of the
1960s was fairly localized, the Los Angeles civil unrest of 1992 affected a
far more expansive area. Although much of the devastation was concen-
trated in south central Los Angeles, numerous hot spots extended well
beyond the boundaries of the Watts rebellion of 1965.91
Fourth, the destruction of both residential units and businesses was
fairly random in past civil disorders, but the contemporary pattern sug-
gests a more systematic process. Small, family owned and operated, eth-
nic businesses (mainly Korean) were the primary targets in the burning
86. W. Kip Viscusi, Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior, in THE BLACK YOUTH EM-
PLOYMENT CRISIS 301, 340-43 (Richard B. Freeman & Harry J. Holzer eds., 1986).
87. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 63-92 (1987).
88. Retrospective View, supra note 16, at 364.
89. Id. at 357 tbls. 1-2.
90. Virginia Postrel, The Real Story Goes Beyond Black and White, L.A. TIMES, May 8,
1992, at All.
91. Seeds of Rebellion, supra note 11, at 116.
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and the looting.92
Finally, the verdict in the Los Angeles police brutality trial
prompted acts of protest-violent and nonviolent-in many more cities
than did the events precipitating the civil disorders of the 1960s. There
was random property damage and looting in such diverse cities as At-
lanta, Las Vegas, Minneapolis, New York, Omaha, Seattle, and Wash-
ington, D.C., although the incidents were not on a scale comparable to
those in Los Angeles.93 In New York, the type of civil unrest that para-
lyzed Los Angeles did not materialize, mainly because the mayor took
specific steps to reduce tensions in the city.94 There was, however, a lit-
eral "emptying out" of midtown Manhattan on early Friday afternoon
(May lst) as most businesses closed early in anticipation of civil unrest.95
A wide array of initiatives has been proposed or launched by a range
of public and private organizations to rebuild Los Angeles in the after-
math of this civil disturbance. Rebuild LA (now called RLA), headed by
former baseball commissioner Peter Ueberroth, is the most visible and
highly touted of these efforts. 96 The Board of Directors of RLA is com-
prised of representatives from government, business, community organi-
zations, and a range of special interest groups. The organization has a
professional staff of lawyers, accountants, planners, and advertising and
public relations experts to oversee the development of its strategies for
rebuilding south central Los Angeles. 97
RLA's overall strategy is evolving, but the central goal is to create
"thousands of permanent jobs and giv[e] new hope to residents who feel
economically disenfranchised." 98 Ueberroth proposes to achieve this
goal not by attempting to lure a few large employers to the area, but
rather by encouraging a large number of companies to open small opera-
tions in south central Los Angeles.99
A recent Los Angeles Times survey, however, revealed that a signifi-
cant number of the firms on the RLA list of private sector contributors
92. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
93. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., From Coast to Coast, Cities are Struggling to Control a
Swell of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, § 1, at 10; Dirk Johnson, When Rumor Mixes
With Racial Rage, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, § 1, at 23; Alison Mitchell, Fears and Rumors
Roil a Nervous New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, § 1, at 1.
94. See David N. Dinkins, Will Washington Heed the Marchers?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
1992, at A31.
95. Id.
96. Richard W. Stevenson, With Few Tools, Ueberroth Begins Mission in Riot Area, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1992, at A23.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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denied ever pledging financial support to the rebuilding effort. 100 Several
of the corporate heads indicated that they had never spoken to Mr. Ueb-
erroth about the RLA initiative.101 The results of the Times survey, and
other controversies surrounding RLA, cast considerable doubt on its
likely effectiveness in rebuilding the economically marginal communities
of south central Los Angeles.
Meanwhile, newly elected President Bill Clinton has proposed an
attractive plan for rebuilding south central Los Angeles and other poor
inner-city communities.102 He campaigned on a platform that empha-
sized urban revitalization as one of the keys to the future economic via-
bility and competitiveness of the United States in the global marketplace.
President Clinton has vowed to implement specific policies to rebuild the
urban infrastructure, to spur urban economic growth and development,
and to address the social ills afflicting U.S. cities.103
In contrast to the adversarial relationship that existed between
many large cities and the Bush Administration, President Clinton has
proposed a formal partnership with the nation's mayors in an effort to
reverse urban decline. He plans to target fiscal assistance to the most
needy cities and to implement a national public works investment pro-
gram to rebuild the infrastructure of all cities. The President also sup-
ports the establishment of enterprise zones in areas within cities (and
poor rural areas) that have experienced massive disinvestment through
plant closings and capital flight.11 He intends to offer businesses tax
breaks and other incentives to locate in these newly established enterprise
zones. While there is no history of success for such strategies in poor
communities like south central Los Angeles, 05 enterprise zones may be-
come attractive to private businesses and result in positive outcomes for
minority residents, if they are developed in conjunction with President
Clinton's efforts to rebuild the urban infrastructure.
In conjunction with his efforts to lure businesses back to the central
city, President Clinton also intends to encourage entrepreneurship as a
second job creation strategy.10 6 He contends that improved access to
capital is the key to small business development. He has proposed two
100. Nancy Rivera-Brooks & Henry Weinstein, 19 of 68 Firms Question Listing by Rebuild
L.A., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at Al, A18, A19.
101. Id.
102. See The Platform: Party Statement of Policies Mirrors Clinton's Goals, CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP., July 18, 1992, at 2107 [hereinafter The Platform].
103. Id. at 2108.
104. Id.
105. See David Osborne, The Kemp Cure-All, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1989, at 21, 24-25.
106. The Platform, supra note 102, at 2108.
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strategies for increasing the flow and availability of capital in central city
communities: (1) establishing a national network of community develop-
ment banks and (2) stronger enforcement of the Community Reinvest-
ment Act of 1977, which was instituted to monitor the lending practices
of private banks, savings and loans, and other financial institutions. 107
To improve the quality of life of inner-city residents (especially poor
youth) and to enhance their employment prospects, President Clinton
proposes to invest substantial resources in existing programs known to
benefit the urban disadvantaged (e.g., Head Start and Job Corps) and in
new initiatives targeting specific urban ills. To combat high rates of
school failure and to improve the quality of education in the inner city,
for example, the President supports a number of educational reforms,
including site-based decision making and public school choice, which are
designed to eliminate the inequalities that presently exist in urban public
school systems.108
In response to the youth unemployment problem, President Clinton
proposes to establish a summer jobs initiative and training program as
well as a national apprenticeship program to facilitate an easier school-
to-work transition for non-college-bound students. 10 9 He also supports
putting more police on the streets to combat crime in inner-city commu-
nities.110 Rather than deploying extra police in the random, dragnet-type
sweeps sanctioned by the Bush Administration, however, the President's
proposal supports community policing programs where the officers inter-
act with residents prior to the commission of a crime.
Finally, President Clinton proposes to increase government spend-
ing on resources-education and training, health care, and quality child
care-that many women who are the heads of urban households need in
order to become independent and self-sufficient and to break the cycle of
long-term welfare dependency.1 l'
If the new President is successful in forging the necessary congres-
sional support for these ideas, which should be possible given the sizable
majorities that the Democrats have in both houses of Congress, he very
well may succeed in returning U.S. cities to their former status as both
economically viable and socially and culturally acceptable public spaces.
Nothing short of such a comprehensive effort is likely to prevent the oc-
currence of a fire next time.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2110-11.
111. Id. at 2108-09.
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